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Abstract—The data sponsored scheme allows the content
provider to cover parts of the cellular data costs for mobile users.
Thus the content service becomes appealing to more users and
potentially generates more profit gain to the content provider.
In this paper, we consider a sponsored data market with a
monopoly network service provider, a single content provider,
and multiple users. In particular, we model the interactions of
three entities as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the service
provider and content provider act as the leaders determining
the pricing and sponsoring strategies, respectively, in the first
stage, and the users act as the followers deciding on their
data demand in the second stage. We investigate the mutual
interaction of the service provider and content provider in two
cases: (i) competitive case, where the content provider and service
provider optimize their strategies separately and competitively,
each aiming at maximizing the profit and revenue, respectively;
and (ii) cooperative case, where the two providers jointly optimize
their strategies, with the purpose of maximizing their aggregate
profits. We analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in both
cases. Via extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the network
effects significantly improve the payoff of three entities in this
market, i.e., utilities of users, the profit of content provider and
the revenue of service provider. In addition, it is revealed that
the cooperation between the two providers is the best choice for
all three entities.
Index Terms—Data sponsoring, competition and cooperation,
network effects, socially-aware service.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, the demand of cellular data usage continues to
rise sharply, and the high data cost becomes one of the
critical concerns for Mobile Users (MUs) while consuming the
cellular data. Therefore, one of the important challenges for
Content Provider (CP) is how to attract more MUs to access
its contents and thus achieve a higher revenue gain. In 2014,
AT&T launched a data sponsored scheme [1], where the CP
(e.g., Youbube, Twitter) can sponsor their MUs’ cellular data
cost and thereby the MUs access the CP’s contents through
network Service Provider (SP) with lower charge. Clearly, the
data sponsoring potentially creates a triple-win outcome for
MUs, CP and SP. Specifically, MUs benefit from consuming
cellular data with lower price, which increases the data demand
for accessing contents, and in turn the higher demand of MUs
contributes to the revenue gain of CP and SP.
With the remarkable interests from academia and industry,
the data sponsoring has attracted many researchers to inves-
tigate and innovate better schemes. For example, the authors
in [2] addressed the issue faced by both CP and SP when the
amount of content traffic is uncertain, and derived the pricing
by examining traffic data of CP. The sponsoring competition
among multiple CPs was studied in [3], and it was also
demonstrated that the competition improves the payoff for
both SP and CPs. The interaction among the monopoly SP, a
single CP and MUs was modeled as a Stackelberg game in [4],
where the MUs are assumed to be homogeneous. Then, the
authors in [5] studied the similar problem to that in [6], where
non-sponsored and sponsored CP coexist. In [7], the authors
explored the interplay between SP and CPs, and presented
a pricing mechanism for sponsored data that is truthful in
CP’s valuation as well as its underlying traffic. The authors
in [8] studied the service-selection process among the MUs as
an evolutionary population game and demonstrated that how
sponsoring helps to improve the SP’s profit and the MU’s
experience.
However, all of the above works studied the data sponsoring
without considering the complex interactions among MUs.
The data usage demanded by MUs belongs to the information
goods [9], and network effect1 is an important phenomenon of
information economies [10]. The underlying network effects
amid the data sponsored market influence the user behaviors,
which further complicate the interplay between CP and SP.
In this paper, we focus on the competition and cooperation
between CP and SP, while taking the network effects among
MUs into consideration. The contributions of this paper are as
follows:
• We model the interplay among the SP, CP and MUs as
two-stage game, and we study the pricing, sponsoring
strategies as well as data demand, respectively, in data
sponsored market through backward induction.
• We exploit the local network effects utilizing the struc-
tural properties of the underlying social network, which
improve the data demand in a large extent.
• We consider and analyze the interaction between the SP
and CP under non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios,
respectively.
• Our evaluation results reveal the fact that the cooperation
helps achieve the triple-win outcome for three entities,
i.e., the MUs, CP and SP.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We present
the system model and formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game
in Section II. In Section III, we analyze the data demand, the
1Network effect implies that a product or service is more valuable to users
as the number of users increases.
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optimal pricing as well as sponsoring using backward induc-
tion. Next we present the simulation results in Section IV.
Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND GAME FORMULATION
We consider the data sponsored market consisting of three
players: SP, CP and MUs. Their interactions are modeled as
a two-stage game with complete information.
A. MUs’ data demand
Consider a set of MUs N ∆= {1, . . . , N}, each MU i ∈ N
determines their individual data demand, denoted by xi, where
xi > 0. Then, let x
∆
= (x1, . . . , xN ) and x−i represent the data
demand profile of all the MUs and all other MUs other than
MU i, respectively. Then, the utility of MU i is given by:
ui(xi,x−i, pu, θi) = aixi − bixi2 + xi
∑
j∈N gijxj
− c
(∑
j∈N xj
)2
− pu(1− θi)xi. (1)
The first term represents the internal effects that MU i obtains
from consuming the data, for which we use the linear-quadratic
function to characterize the decreasing marginal returns [11].
ai, bi > 0 are personal type factors capturing the MU het-
erogeneity. Similar to [11], the second term xi
∑
j∈N gijxj is
the external benefits gained from network effects, where gij
denotes the influence of MU j on MU i. In social network,
the MUs influence each other by social behaviors via their
relationships, especially in socially-aware service market [10].
In this paper, we assume gij = gji, which means the social
relations are reciprocal.
Since the SP has a limited network capacity, we further
introduce the third term to indicate the congestions, and thus
we apply the quadratic sum form c(
∑
j∈Nxj)
2, similar to [10].
The last term indicates the costs, consisting of the price
charged by SP, pu, and the sponsorship provided by CP, θi.
B. CP’s sponsoring and SP’s pricing
The sponsorship factor θi (θi ∈ [0, 1]) for each MU i is
decided by the CP. The CP’s profit includes an advertisement
utility, and a component depending on its sponsorship. The
cost of the CP associated with the sponsoring is denoted as
pu
∑
i∈N xiθi. Thus, the profit of the CP is formulated as:
P = γ
∑
i∈N (sxi − txi
2)− pu
∑
i∈N xiθi. (2)
We also use the linear-quadratic function with the decreasing
marginal return property to transform the MUs’ data demand
to the monetary revenue of CP. γ is an adjustable parameter
representing the equivalent monetary worth of MUs’ data
demand, and s, t > 0 are coefficients capturing the concavity
extent of the function.
The decision variable of the SP is price pu and we adopt the
uniform pricing in this paper2. We suppose that the revenue
2Generally, the data traffic service fee is the same for all MUs.
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Figure 1. Two-stage Stackelberg game model of the interactions among SP,
CP, and MUs in the data sponsored market.
of the SP comes from the payment from the MUs. Then, the
revenue of the SP is expressed as:
Π = pu
∑
i∈N xi. (3)
C. Two-stage game
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we model the interaction among
the SP, CP and MUs as a two-stage game. In Stage I, the
SP and the CP act simultaneously as the leaders of the two-
stage game. The SP decides the price pu to maximize its
revenue in (3), and the CP determines the sponsoring factor
Θ = [θ1, θ2, . . . , θN ]
> to maximize its profit in (2). In
Stage II, the MUs determine the data demand to maximize its
individual utility in (1), acting as the followers of this game.
III. GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
A. Stage II: MU data demand equilibrium
In the sub-game Gu = {N , {ui}i∈N , [0,+∞)N}, the best
response function of MU i can be obtained in the following
proposition according to the first order derivative condition.
Proposition 1. Given price pu and the sponsorship Θ, and the
data demand profile without MU i, i.e. x−i, the best response
of MU i is obtained as:
F (x−i) = max
{
ai − pu(1− θi)
2bi + 2c
+
∑
j∈N xj
gij − 2c
2bi + 2c
}
.
(4)
Similar to [11], to ensure that each MU has no incentive
to unboundedly increase its data demand, we make a general
assumption as follows.
Assumption 1.
∑
j∈N
gij−2c
2bi+2c
< 1,∀i.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, the existence and the
uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium of sub-game Gu can be
established.
Proof. Please refer to [12] for more details.
For ease of presentation, we define the notations as
follows. G =

0 g12 − 2c · · · g1N − 2c
g21 − 2c 0 · · · g2N − 2c
...
...
. . .
...
gN1 − 2c gN2 − 2c · · · 0
, Λ =

b1 + c 0 · · · 0
0 b2 + c · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · bN + c
 , a = [a1, a2, . . . , aN ]>, 1 =
[1, . . . , 1]>, I is the n × n identity matrix and K = (2Λ −
G)−1. Similar to [12], we consider the ideal situation, as
described in the assumption as follows.
Assumption 2. All MUs have the positive data demand3 at
the Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e., xi > 0,∀i.
To ease the description, we can rewrite (4) in a matrix form
and have the following proposition directly.
Proposition 3. The matrix format of best response of all the
MUs with respect to the data demand is
x∗(Θ, pu) = −K [pu(1−Θ)− a] , (5)
where K is positive definite matrix.
B. Stage I: CP’s sponsoring and SP’s pricing strategies
1) Competition between CP and SP: In this scenario, two
entities, i.e., the SP and the CP compete with each other, and
their interaction can be modeled as a non-cooperative static
game. In this case, the CP aims to maximize its profit and the
SP aims to maximize its revenue simultaneously and selfishly.
Proposition 4. The existence and the uniqueness of the Nash
Equilibrium of the non-cooperative game between the CP and
SP can be guanranteed under the Assumption 3.
Assumption 3. The total payment from MU i to
SP is larger than a threshold, i.e., pu(1 − θi) >
max
{
γs, ai3 ,
[
(
√
2γtK + I)−1
√
γtK
2 a
]
i
}
.
Proof. First, using the first order derivative condition, we de-
rive the best response function of CP, given the strategy of SP,
which is expressed by (7). Similarly, given the strategy of CP,
we obtain the best response of SP as shown in (9). From (5),
we can easily derive that ∂x∂Θ = p
uK and ∂x∂pu = −K(1−Θ).
The steps of obtaining the best response function of CP and
SP are described in (6) and (8), respectively.
Existence: The CP’s strategy space is defined to be within
[0, 1], which is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of the
Euclidean space. Then, we take the second partial derivative of
CP’s objective functionP(Θ) with respect to its own decision
variable Θ, i.e.,
∂2P(Θ)
∂Θ2
= −2tγ(pu)2K2 − 2(pu)2K < 0. (10)
Therefore, the objective function of CP, P(Θ), is continuous
and strictly concave with respect to Θ. Similarly, the objective
function of SP, Π(pu), is strictly concave with respect to its
decision variable pu, since we conclude that the second order
derivative of Π with respect to pu is less than 0, i.e.,
∂2Π(pu)
∂(pu)
2 = −21>K(1−Θ) < 0. (11)
3In the typical market, the monopolist seller wants to charge individuals
low enough (lower than a threshold), so that all consumers would like to
purchase a positive amount of goods [11]. Specifically, if MUs are charged
appropriately, none of MUs chooses zero data demand.
Recall from Assumption 2, pu is smaller than a threshold, and
pu is larger than 0. Accordingly, the price pu is a nonempty
convex and compact subset of the Euclidean space. Thus,
the Nash equilibrium exists in this non-cooperative sub-game
between CP and SP [13].
Uniqueness: The Jacobian matrix of point-to-set mapping
with respect to the utility profile of CP and SP, ∇F =
∇F(P(Θ),Π(pu)) =
 ∂2P(Θ)∂Θ2 ∂2P(Θ)∂Θ∂pu(
∂2Π(pu)
∂Θ∂pu
)>
∂2Π(pu)
∂(pu)2
 . Then,
∇F +∇F> is represented by (12). We decompose the matrix
in (12) into the form of −A − B − C, and the matrices
are shown in (13). If we can conclude that ∇F + ∇F>
is negative definite under Assumption 3, then, ∇F is diag-
onally strictly concave, and accordingly the Nash equilib-
rium of this non-cooperative sub-game is unique [13]. To
prove −A − B − C is negative definite, we can prove that
matrices A, B and C are all positive definite. Based on
the matrix congruence theorem, if Q′ = P>QP and P is
invertible, then Q and Q′ have the same numbers of posi-
tive, negative, and zero eigenvalues [14]. We use the matrix
P1 =
[
I
(
−4γt(pu)2K2
)−1
2γtK2 [a− 2pu (1−Θ)]
0 1
]
and we obtain the congruence of matrix A, A′ in (14). Now we
only need to prove that A′ is positive definite, i.e., 21>K(1−
Θ) − γtK2[a− 2pu(1−Θ)]> K2
(pu)2
[a − 2pu(1 − Θ)] > 0.
Then, we have 2Θ>K(1 − Θ) + 2(1−Θ)>K(1 − Θ) −
[
√
tγ
pu a− 2
√
tγ(1−Θ)]>K2[
√
tγ
pu a − 2
√
tγ(1 − Θ)] > 0.
Accordingly, 1 − Θ > √K[
√
tγ
2pu a − 2
√
tγ(1 − Θ)]. At
last, we derive pu(1 − Θ) >
[(√
2γtK + I
)−1√γtK
2 a
]
.
Under the same procedure, we use the matrix P2 =[
I
(
3(pu)
2
K
)−1
γsK1
0 1
]
to obtain B′ in (15), then we
need to prove that 1>K(1−Θ)−γ2s21> K
3(pu)2
1 = Θ>K(1−
Θ)+(1−Θ)>K(1−Θ)−
(
γs√
3pu
1
)>
K2 γs√
3pu
1 > 0. Accord-
ingly, we have pu(1−Θ) > γs√
3
1. Similarly, using the matrix
P3 =
[
I −
(
(pu)
2
K
)−1
[a− 4pu (1−Θ)]
0 1
]
, we have C′
in (16). To prove C′ is positive definite, we need to prove
1>K(1−Θ)− [a− 4pu(1−Θ)]> K
(pu)2
[a−4pu(1−Θ)] > 0.
With simple transformations, we have pu(1−Θ) > a5 in the
final step. Accordingly, we have proved that the positive def-
initeness of A, B and C are easily guaranteed, if Assumption
3 holds. Thus, the proof is completed.
Then, we use the best-response dynamics for calculating the
Nash equilibrium of the two-player non-cooperative game in
this stage. So far, we have proved that each Nash equilibrium
of sub-game in this Stackelberg game is unique under Assump-
tions 1 and 3. Then, we can conclude that this Stackelberg
game is a weakly acyclic game, and thus the convergence
∂P(Θ)
∂Θ
= γsp
u
K1− 2tγpuK2[a− pu(1−Θ)]− puKa + (pu)2K(1−Θ)− (pu)2KΘ = 0,
⇒ (2tγpuK + 2puI)θ = γs1− 2tγK(a− pu1)− a + pu1, (6)
⇒ Θ∗(pu,x∗) = 1
2pu
(tγK + I)
−1 [
γs1 + (2tγK + I)
(
p
u
1− a)] . (7)
∂Π(pu)
∂pu
= 1
>
K
[
a− pu (1−Θ)]+ pu1> [−K (1−Θ)] = 1>Ka− 2pu1>K (1−Θ) = 0, (8)
⇒ {pu}∗(Θ,x∗) =
[
21
>
K(1−Θ)
]−1
1
>
Ka. (9)
[ −4tγ(pu)2K2 − 4(pu)2K γsK1− 2γtK2 [a− 2pu (1−Θ)]−K [a− 4pu(1−Θ)](
γsK1− 2γtK2 [a− 2pu(1−Θ)]−K [a− 4pu(1−Θ)])> −41>K(1−Θ)
]
(12)
[
4tγ(pu)2K2 2γtK2[a − 2pu(1 − Θ)]
2γt[a − 2pu(1 − Θ)]>K2 21>K(1 − Θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
,
[
3(pu)2K −γsK1
−γs1>K 1>K(1 − Θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
,
[
(pu)2K K[a − 4pu(1 − Θ)]
[a − 4pu(1 − Θ)]>K 1>K(1 − Θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
(13)
A
′
= P
>
1 AP1 =
[
4tγ(pu)2K2 0
0 21>K(1−Θ)− γtK2[a− 2pu(1−Θ)]> K2
(pu)2
[a− 2pu(1−Θ)]
]
(14)
B
′
= P
>
2 BP2 =
[
3(pu)2K 0
0 1>K(1−Θ)− γ2s21> K
3(pu)2
1
]
(15)
C
′
= P
>
3 CP3 =
[
(pu)2K 0
0 1>K(1−Θ)− [a− 4pu(1−Θ)]> K
(pu)2
[a− 4pu(1−Θ)]
]
(16)
of the game is guaranteed [15]. Therefore, the best-response
dynamics algorithm can achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium.
2) Cooperation between CP and SP: In the non-cooperative
game, the interaction among selfish players may lead to an
inefficient Nash Equilibrium (NE). In order to address the
well-known inefficiency of NE of the non-cooperative game,
we consider another practical cooperative setting between the
CP and the SP. In this case, the interaction between the
two providers is modeled as optimization problem. Thus, the
objectives of the CP and SP are to maximize their aggregate
payoff.
In particular, we consider the SP and CP as a single
entity, referred to as a coalition. Then, in Stage I, the CP-SP
coalition determines the sponsoring and the pricing strategies
jointly, with the purpose of maximizing their aggregate payoff,
i.e., R = P + Π. Therefore, the CP-SP coalition’s payoff
maximization problem is formulated as follows:
maximize
θi,pu
R = γ
∑
i∈N
(sxi − txi2) + pu
∑
i∈N
xi(1− θi)
subject to x = −K [pu(1−Θ)− a] .
(17)
We can rewrite the objective function of (17) in a matrix
form, and eliminate x from objective function with KKT
condition. Then, we apply the second-order partial derivative
to check its Hessian matrix. Thus, we conclude the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. Under Assumption 3, the objective function
in (17) is strictly concave with respect to its both decision
variables Θ and pu, and thus there exists unique globally
optimal solutions for {Θ∗, {pu}∗}.
Proof. The Hessian matrix of objective functionR(Θ, pu) can
be obtained from
 ∂2R∂Θ2 ∂2R∂Θ∂pu(
∂2R
∂Θ∂pu
)>
∂2R
∂(pu)2
, as shown in (18).
Similar to that in the proof of Proposition 4, we decompose the
Hessian matrix into three matrix −D−E−F, and the matrices
are shown in (19). To prove that (18) is negative definite, we
can simply prove that D, E and F are all positive definite.
Here we also use the matrix congruence theorem, to prove
the positivity of its congruence matrix. Specifically, we use
P4 =
[
I −
(
2tγ(pu)
2
K2
)−1
2tγK2 [a− 2pu (1−Θ)]
0 1
]
to obtain D′ in (20). To prove that D′ is positive definite,
we have −2γt
[
a
pu − 2 (1−Θ)
]>
K2
[
a
pu − 2 (1−Θ)
]
+
2tγ(1−Θ)>K2(1−Θ) > 0. Moreover, we have (1−Θ) >
a
pu − 2 (1−Θ), which implies pu (1−Θ) > a3 . Then, we
use P5 =
[
I −
(
(pu)
2
K
)−1
K [a− 4pu (1−Θ)]
0 1
]
and
P6 =
[
I
(
(pu)
2
K
)−1
γsK1
0 1
]
to obtain E′ in (21) and F′
in (22). Similarly, to prove that E′ and F′ are positive definite,
we have to ensure (1−Θ)>K (1−Θ)− γ2s21> K
(pu)2
1 > 0
and −[a− 4pu (1−Θ)]> K
(pu)2
[a− 4pu (1−Θ)] +
(1−Θ)>K (1−Θ) > 0, which corresponds to
pu (1−Θ) > γs1 and pu (1−Θ) > a5 , respectively.
We can see the condition where the Hessian matrix of R
[ −2tγ(pu)2K2 − 2(pu)2K2 γsK1− 2γtK2 [a− 2pu (1−Θ)]−K [a− 4pu (1−Θ)](
γsK1− 2γtK2 [a− 2pu (1−Θ)]−K [a− 4pu (1−Θ)])> −2tγ(1−Θ)>K2 (1−Θ)− 2(1−Θ)>K (1−Θ)
]
(18)
[
2tγ(pu)2K2 2γtK2 [a− 2pu (1−Θ)]
2γt[a− 2pu (1−Θ)]>K2 2γt(1−Θ)>K2 (1−Θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
,
[
(pu)2K K [a− 4pu (1−Θ)]
[a− 4pu (1−Θ)]>K (1−Θ)>K (1−Θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
,
[
(pu)2K −γsK1
−γs1>K (1−Θ)>K (1−Θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
(19)
D
′
=P4
>
DP4 =
[
2tγ(pu)2K2 0
0 2tγ(1−Θ)>K2(1−Θ)−2γt[a−2pu (1−Θ)]> K2
(pu)2
[a−2pu (1−Θ)]
]
(20)
E
′
=P5
>
EP5 =
[
(pu)2K 0
0 (1−Θ)>K (1−Θ)−[a−4pu (1−Θ)]> K
(pu)2
[a−4pu (1−Θ)]
]
(21)
F
′
=P6
>
FP6 =
[
(pu)2K 0
0 (1−Θ)>K (1−Θ)− γ2s21> K
(pu)2
1
]
(22)
is negative definite holds under Assumption 3. The proof is
completed.
However, it is impossible to derive the closed form solution
for Θ∗ and {pu}∗, due to their complicated expression. In
our performance evaluation, we can apply the low-complexity
iterative algorithms based on the gradient assisted binary
search algorithm to find the optimal sponsorship Θ∗ and
optimal price {pu}∗, which are the optimal solutions in Stage I.
In all, the {x∗,Θ∗, {pu}∗} solved in Section III-B2 is the
Stackelberg equilibrium for this two-stage game.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we perform the simulations to evaluate the
performance of the strategy adaptation of the SP, CP, and
MUs in data sponsored market under the competitive and
cooperative cases. We consider a group of N MUs in a
social network and assume that the parameters of MUs ai
and bi follow the normal distribution N (µa, 1) and N (µb, 1).
Likewise, the social tie gij between any two MUs i and j
follows a normal distributionN (µg, 1). The default parameters
are set as follows: c = 3, γ = 2, s = t = 5, µa = µb = 30,
µg = 4 and N = 100.
We first investigate the impact from varying the number
of MUs on the three entities of data sponsored market, i.e.,
MUs, CP and SP, as shown in Fig. 2. As expected, the
total data demand of MUs, the profit of CP and the revenue
of SP increase as the number of MUs increases, in either
competitive or cooperative case. The reason is that adding
more MUs would enhance each MU’s interactions with others,
and potentially stimulate more data demand of new coming
MUs. However, owing to the congestion effects, the marginal
increase of the data demand decreases as the number of MUs
increases. Meanwhile, the CP provides more sponsorship for
the coming MUs. We also observe that the optimal price
increases with the increase of number of MUs. This is because
as the number of MUs increases, more MUs have higher
intrinsic demands, so that increasing the price does not result
in significant decrease in total demand. Thus, both the CP and
SP extract more surplus from MUs and have higher payoff.
We then investigate the impact of network effects on these
three entities, and the results are shown in Fig. 3. In both com-
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Figure 2. The impact of the total number of MUs on three entities of data
sponsored market.
petitive and cooperative cases, the total data demand of MUs,
the profit of CP and the revenue of SP increase significantly
with stronger network effects. Additionally, as the network
effects become stronger, the demand of each MU is promoted
due to stronger positive interdependency of each other. When
the demand of MUs is high enough, consequently the CP is
able to provide lower sponsorship to save money. We find that
the optimal price increases as the network effects becomes
stronger. The reason is that when the network effect is stronger,
the additional benefits obtained due to network effects are
greater. To take advantage of the underlying network effects,
the SP sets a lower price to encourage more MUs, and each
MU will be influenced by neighbours for higher data demand.
Thus, the SP achieves higher revenue correspondingly.
Next, we evaluate the impact of congestion on three entities,
as illustrated in Fig. 4. We observe that the total data demand
of MUs decreases as the congestion increases. This is because
the congestion has a negative impact on the data demand of
MUs. Then, the SP does not need to set a lower price to attract
more MUs, which may decrease the total data demand further.
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Figure 3. The impact of social network effects on three entities of data
sponsored market.
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Figure 4. The impact of congestion effects on three entities of data sponsored
market.
At the same time, the CP needs to provide more sponsorship
with the increase of price to retain the original MUs at least,
which may incur more costs. Accordingly, the profit of CP
and the revenue of SP decrease as the congestion increases.
At last, we study the impact of competition and cooperation
between CP and SP in Figs. 2-4. Recall that in cooperative
case, the CP-SP coalition aims to maximize their aggregate
payoff. In other words, the coalition is able to adopt the
discriminatory pricing in this market. In this case, the coalition
usually sets a lower price, and provides more and appropriate
distribution of sponsorship to better encourage all the MUs.
Therefore, the cooperation between the CP and SP helps
to achieve higher aggregate payoff, as indicated in Figs. 2-
4. However, in the competitive case, when SP sets a lower
price, the CP provides less sponsorship to maximize its profit
because the sponsorship is not necessary when the price is
low enough. As a result, the aggregate payoff of CP and SP
decreases, compared with the cooperative case. All the results
in Figs. 2-4 clearly show that the cooperation between CP
and SP is the best choice for all of three entities in the data
sponsored market.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a two-stage game to model the data
sponsored market. In particular, we have focused on the
interaction between a single service provider and a single
content provider. Further, we have taken the impacts of net-
work effects into account to reconsider the competition and
the cooperation in the data sponsored market. Specifically, the
network effects in the social domain and congestions in the
network domain have been jointly considered for modeling
the interactions among mobile users. Under this setting, we
have characterized the scenario where the service provider
and content provider compete separately, and the scenario
where the service provider and content provider cooperate for
a common goal. Finally, through extensive simulations, it has
been verified that the cooperation is the best choice for three
entities, i.e., the service provider, content provider and mobile
users. For the future work, we will further consider the unfixed
payment from the content provider to the service provider.
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